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Abstract 
In a tree enterprise, users reside at the nodes of the tree and their aim is to connect hemselves, 
directly or indirectly, to the root of the tree. The construction costs of arcs of the tree are given 
by means of the arc-cost-function associated with the tree. Further the bankruptcy venture is 
described in terms of the estate of the bankrupt firm and the claims of the various creditors. The 
first objective of the paper is to provide conditions (on the claims and the surplus of the claims 
in the bankruptcy venture) which are sufficient and necessary for the bankruptcy venture to agree 
with some tree enterprise. It is established that the bankruptcy venture agrees with some tree 
enterprise if and only if the surplus of claims in the bankruptcy venture is at most the size of 
the second smallest claim (in the weak sense). For that purpose, both the tree enterprise as well 
as the bankruptcy venture are modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utility. Within 
the framework of cooperative game theory, the proof of the equivalence theorem concerning 
the tree enterprise game and the bankruptcy game, under the given circumstances, is based on 
graph-theoretic tools in a tree structure. As an adjunct to the proof of the equivalence theorem, 
the solution concept of the nucleolus for specific tree enterprises is determined. 
Keywords: Tree; Cooperative game; Tree game; Bankruptcy game 
1. The standard tree enterprise in comparison with the bankruptcy venture: 
game-theoretic models 
Let (V,E) be a directed graph with node set V and arc set E, which is provided 
with a (nonnegative) arc-cost-function a : E + R+. The graph can be regarded as the 
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mathematical model of a cable-television network in which one central supplier (the 
central station broadcasting cable-television signals) is located at a distinguished node 
(denoted by 0) and the users in the remaining nodes so that every user resides at exactly 
one node. The aim of the users is to connect themselves, directly or indirectly, to the 
central supplier by constructing connecting-links (i.e., arcs of the graph) through which 
the cable-television signals are transmitted. The construction costs of connecting-links 
are given by means of the arc-cost-function associated with the graph. Throughout 
this paper it is supposed that the users in the network are connected to the central 
supplier through a standard tree enterprise. We say the directed graph is a standard 
tree enterprise if, for each vertex, there is a unique path from the distinguished node 0, 
called the root of the tree, to that vertex. All arcs are directed away from the root 
of the tree and the construction of arcs not in the tree is regarded infeasible (or too 
costly). 
In the game-theoretic literature the former standard tree enterprise has been modelled 
as a cooperative cost game (N,c). The player set N represents the set of users in the 
cable-television network (i.e., nodes of the standard tree enterprise different from the 
root) and the cost function ~:2~ + R is defined so that, for each coalition S c N, 
the cost c(S) equals the least cost to connect all users in S to 
the central supplier 0 via arcs of the standard tree enterprise. (1.1) 
The so-called standard tree enterprise game (N, c) of (1.1) was discussed in [9- 111. 
The game-theoretic analysis of the standard tree enterprise deals with the cost allocation 
problem of setting charges to the users in order to allocate the overall cost c(N). How 
to allocate the least total construction costs of connecting-links to the users in the 
network? 
In addition to the cost allocation problem in a standard tree enterprise, we address the 
division problem how to divide the estate of a bankrupt firm among various creditors. 
The problem is that the claims of the creditors are mutually inconsistent in that the 
estate is insufficient to meet all of the claims. In the game-theoretic literature the latter 
bankruptcy venture has been modelled as a cooperative savings game (N, u). The player 
set N represents the set of creditors and the savings function u: 2N -+ R’ is defined so 
that, for each coalition S c N, the worth u(S) equals either zero or what is left of the 
estate after each creditor outside S is paid his claim. That is, 
u(S) := max 0, E - c dj 
[ 1 for all S c N, (1.2) jEN\S 
where E denotes the estate of the bankrupt firm and di the claim of creditor i, i E N. It is 
always supposed that the estate E satisfies 0 <E 6 CjEN dj (otherwise, the bankruptcy 
problem would not exist). The so-called bankruptcy game (N, u) of (1.2) was intro- 
duced in [12] and is studied in [2-81. 
Notice that the game model of the standard tree enterprise is formulated in terms 
of cost figures, whereas the game model of the bankruptcy venture is in terms of 
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savings. In order to be able to compare both game models, there is associated with 
the given cost function ~:2~ + R of (1.1) the cost savings function W: 2N + R de- 
fined by w(S) := CjEs c<(j)) - c(S) for all S c N. Here the worth w(S) represents 
the cost savings that would result from cooperation between the members of S 
instead of acting alone. Clearly, individuals earn no cost savings, i.e., w({i}) =0 
for all i E N. Generally speaking, the bankruptcy game (N, U) of ( 1.2) fails to be a 
zero-normalized game, i.e., u( {i}) = 0 for all i E N. Throughout the remainder of the 
paper, we replace the bankruptcy game (N,u) by its zero-normalized version (N,v) 
defined by 
f_(S) := u(S) - 1 u( {j}) for all S c N, 
jtS 
or equivalently, 
u(S) = C min[d,, d] - min Cd,, d 
[ 1 for all S c N. (1.3) jES .icS 
Here the nonnegative surplus of cluims defined by A := CjEN d, - E represents the 
part of the claims that cannot be met by the estate. 
The (first) main goal of the paper is to establish that, under certain circumstances, 
the bankruptcy division problem can be treated as an equivalent of the cost allocation 
problem in some standard tree enterprise. In terminology of the corresponding game 
models, it will be proved in Section 2 that, under certain conditions on the estate and the 
claims, the zero-normalized bankruptcy game agrees with the cost savings game arising 
from some standard tree enterprise game. Thus, given the game (N, u) of (1.3), we look 
for a standard tree enterprise game (N, c) of (1.1) satisfying v(S) := CjEs c({ j})-c(S) 
for all S c N. The main results of Section 2 are stated in Theorems 2.1 and 2.3. 
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the study of all kinds of 
solution concepts, such as the core, stable sets, bargaining set, (pre)kemel, nucleolus, 
Shapley value and r-value (cf. [5]). In the context of the bankruptcy game (N,u) of 
(1.2), almost all solution concepts are well studied and determined in an appropriate 
manner (cf. [2, 3, 5, 12]), whereas, in the setting of the standard tree enterprise game 
(N, c) of (1.1 ), one has to go to a lot of trouble to determine the above solution 
concepts, especially the nucleolus (cf. [lo]). 
As an adjunct to the forthcoming proof of Theorem 2.3, Section 3 deals with the 
concept of the nucleolus for the specific standard tree enterprises which we shall en- 
counter within the proof of Theorem 2.3. The (second) main goal of the paper is to 
exploit the equivalence between bankruptcy ventures and standard tree enterprises in 
the sense that we first discuss the elegant description of the nucleolus for those spe- 
cific bankruptcy ventures (taken from the development of the nucleolus for general 
bankruptcy ventures) and next we transfer the obtained result for the nucleolus from 
the bankruptcy venture to the underlying standard tree enterprise by means of a simple 
relationship between cost and savings allocations. 
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Remark 1.1. Every zero-normalized 2-person bankruptcy game (N, u) of (1.3) agrees 
with the cost savings game arising from the tree enterprise game of which the arc- 
cost-function a of the underlying chain enterprise on node set {0,1,2} is given by 
a((0, 1)) := v({ 1,2}) and a(( 1,2)) arbitrarily chosen from Iw+. 
Remark 1.2. If there is no surplus in the bankruptcy problem (i.e., A = 0), then the 
zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game (N, v) of (1.3) is the trivial null game (i.e., 
u(S) = 0 for all S c N). The trivial null game, on its turn, agrees with the cost savings 
game arising from the standard tree enterprise game of which the underlying standard 
tree enterprise on node set NU{O} is composed of the arcs (O,i), ieN (with an 
arbitrarily chosen arc-cost-function). 
Remark 1.3. It is well-known (cf. [3, 51) that the bankruptcy game (N,u) of (1.2) is a 
convex game, i.e., u(S U {i}) - u(S) 6 u(T U {i}) - u(T) for all i E N and all S, T C N 
such that S c T c N\(i). C onsequently, the zero-normalized bankruptcy game (N, v) of 
(1.3) is convex as well. Further, it is known (cf. [lo]) that the standard tree enterprise 
game (N, c) of (1.1) is a concave game, i.e., c(SU {i}) - c(S) 3 c(TU {i}) - c(T) 
for all i E N and all S, T c N such that S c T c N\(i). Thus, the cost savings game 
associated with a standard tree enterprise game is a convex game. From the viewpoint 
of the convexity property for games, both types of a game (standard tree enterprise 
game versus bankruptcy game) match. 
Example 1.4. Involving the standard tree enterprises on node set (0, 1,2,3}, there 
are four possibilities for the structure of the underlying tree. We list the arc set of 
each possible form of the standard tree enterprise r and describe the cost savings 
game (N, w) arising from the corresponding standard tree enterprise game (N, c). Write 
{L2,3}={4,h,i3). 
l r = ((0, I>, (0,2), @,3)} and (N, ) g w a rees with the trivial null game, i.e., w(S)=0 
for all S c N (see Remark 1.2). 
l r={(O,ii), (O,iz), (i],i3)} and (N,w) is given by w({il,i3})=w({il,i2,i3})= 
~((0, il )) and w(S) = 0 otherwise. Notice that in this situation the users ii and i3 are 
substitutes, that is interchanging the roles of the users ii and i3 does not change the 
cost savings game (N, w). 
l r={(O,i,), (ii,i2), (il,i3)} and (N,w) is given by w(S)=(IS - l)u((O,ii)) for all 
S c N, S f0. Here ISI denotes the number of members of coalition S. Notice that 
this game is symmetric, that is the cost savings merely depend on the number of 
users in coalition S and not the users themselves. 
l r={(O,ii), (il,i2), (iz,ij)} and (N,w) given by 
=4(O,i1))+4(i1, i2)) and w({il,i2,i3})=2a((O,i1 >>+a((il, &I). 
Notice that in this situation the users i2 and i3 are substitutes. 
Example 1.5. Look at the bankruptcy venture with the three different claims di = 100, 
d2 = 150, d3 = 175, and the estates E = 300 and E = 250, respectively. 
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(i) Suppose E = 300. Then the zero-normalized three-person bankruptcy game (N, v) 
of (1.3) is given by a({i})=O for all iEN, ~({1,2})=v({l,3})= 100, ~({2,3})= 125 
and v(N) = 225. It appears that this bankruptcy venture can be associated with the 
chain enterprise on node set {0,1,2,3} of which the arc-cost-function a is given 
by ~((0, 1)) = 100, a(( 1,2)) = 25, a((2,3)) = 0. The standard tree enterprise game 
(N, c) corresponding to this chain enterprise is given by c({ 1}) = 100 and c(S) = 125 
for all S c N, S # 0, { 1). Obviously, the cost savings game associated with this stan- 
dard tree enterprise game (N,c) agrees with the zero-normalized bankruptcy game 
(N, c). 
(ii) Suppose E =250. Then the zero-normalized three-person bankruptcy game 
(N,L.) of (1.3) is given by c({i})=O for all iEN, t’({1,2})=75, 2;({1,3})=100, 
c( {2,3}) = 150 and v(N) = 250. Since this zero-normalized three-person game does 
not agree with one of the four possible types of a cost savings game listed in Example 
1.4. we conclude that this bankruptcy venture cannot be associated with any standard 
tree enterprise on node set (0, 1,2,3}. 
2. The representation of bankruptcy ventures as standard tree enterprises 
In this section we are concerned with the possible representation of the zero- 
normalized bankruptcy game as the cost savings game arising from a standard tree 
enterprise game. That is, we aim to provide conditions (on the claims and the sur- 
plus of claims in the bankruptcy venture) which are sufficient and necessary for the 
cost savings relationship between zero-normalized bankruptcy games and standard tree 
enterprise games. 
Let N = { 1,2,. . , n} be the set of creditors. Given the claims d,, i EN, of the cred- 
itors, we may order these claims, without loss of generality, so that 0 < d, < dZ 6 . 
< d,. The number of members of coalition S is denoted by ISI. In view of Remark 1.1, 
we assume throughout this section that there are at least three creditors, so n 3 3. 
Theorem 2.1. Let n > 3. If the surplus of claims in the bunkruptcy venture is at 
most the size of the second smallest claim (in the weak sense, i.e., 0 6 A < dZ where 
A := zjE,,, d, -E), then the zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game (N, v) of (1.3) 
can be represented as the cost savings gume arising from a standard tree enterprise 
game with user set N. 
Proof. Suppose that 0 < A d d2. From dJ 3 dz 3 A for all j E N\{ 1) and formula 
(1.3) we deduce that the zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game (N,v) is 
given by 
v(S) = 
(IS - l)A for all ScN\{l}, sf0, 
min[di, A]+(lSI -2)A for all ScN with le,S, S#{l} 
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Consider the chain enterprise on node set N U (0) of which the arc-cost-function a 
is given by 
a((0, 1)) := min[dt, d], 4(1,2)):= max[O, d - dr] 
a((i- l,i)):=O for all i~N\{1,2} 
Let (N,c) be the standard tree enterprise game corresponding to this chain enter- 
prise. Then c({l})= min[dt, d] and c(S) = min[dt, d] + max[O, d - d,] = d for 
all S E~~\{Q),{ 1)). Particularly, c<(j))= A for all j EN\{ 1). Now it follows imme- 
diately that cjEs c<(j)) - c(S) = u(S) f or all S c N. Hence, the game (N, u) is the 
cost savings game arising from the standard tree enterprise game (N,c) associated with 
the given chain enterprise (provided that 0 d A d dz). Cl 
Remark 2.2. The arc-cost-function a listed in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is not unique 
since the cost of the arc (n - 1,n) may be arbitrarily chosen from lR+ instead of zero. 
Although the cost c(S) of any coalition S containing user n (i.e., the unique leaf of 
the chain) will be increased by the size of a((n - 1, n)), the corresponding cost savings 
game does not change. 
Theorem 2.3. Let n > 3 and suppose that the surplus of claims in the bankruptcy 
venture is positive (that is, A := CjEN , d. - E > 0). If the zero-normalized n-person 
bankruptcy game (N, v) of (1.3) can be represented as the cost savings game arising 
from a standard tree enterprise game with user set N, then the surplus of claims is 
at most the size of the second smallest claim. 
Proof. Suppose that the zero-normalized bankruptcy game (N, v) of (1.3) agrees with 
the cost savings game arising from some standard tree enterprise game (N,c) with user 
set N (given that n 2 3 and A>O). That is, the cost savings relationship CjEs c({ j}) 
-c(S) = v(S) holds for all S c N and moreover, formula (1.3) involving the worth v(S), 
S c N, holds as well. 
Let p 3 1 be the degree of the root 0 in the underlying standard tree enterprise r. We 
think the tree enterprise r on node set N U (0) to be composed of various subtree enter- 
prises r(l), r(*), . . . , r(P), rooted at node 0, on node sets N(l) U {0}, NC*) U {0}, . . . , N(p) 
u {0}, respectively (so, the various coalitions N (0 1 d C d p, do not contain the root , 
0 and form a partition of the player set N). Clearly, by definition, the standard tree en- 
terprise game (N,c) satisfies c(N) = C,“=, c(N(‘)). Therefore, the overall cost savings 
for the grand coalition N in r are attainable as the sum of the overall cost savings 
in the various subtrees r(‘) on node sets NC’) U {0}, 1 </ 6 p. Our objective is to 
study the possible decomposition of r into various subtrees and next, to determine the 
overall cost savings in each subtree of r. 
For the moment let us concentrate on one subtree r(r), rooted at node 0, of r. Let 
node il EN (l) be the unique follower of node 0 in r(l), that is r(l) contains the arc 
(0, it). In case node il has no followers in r(l) (that is, r(l) contains exactly one 
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arc), then the subtree r(l) generates no cost savings. Without loss of generality we 
may suppose that node il has at least one follower, say node i2 EN(‘), in r(l), so the 
arc (il, i2) belongs to r (I) The cost savings for the coalition {il, i2) in r(l) can be . 
determined in two ways: on the one hand, c({il})+c({i2})-c({il,i2})=a((O,il)) and 
on the other, by using (1.3) v({il,iz})= min[d,, , A] + min[dj,, d] - min[d;, + d,?, d]. 
From this we deduce that 
a((0, il)) = min[d,, , A] + min[d,:, d] - min[d;, + di:, d]. (2.1) 
Without loss of generality we may suppose that a((0, il ))>O in r(l) (otherwise, if 
a((O,il)) =O, then the arc (0,ii) is costless and we may reconsider node il as the root 
instead of node 0, and so on). From (2.1), together with ~((0, il)) > 0, it follows that 
di, + d;? > d and hence, (2.1) reduces to 
~((0, ii )) = min[di,, A] + min[di,, d] - d in P’). (2.2) 
Consider an arbitrary third node i3 EN (I) in r(’ ’ (which node is always connected, 
directly or indirectly, with node il). The previous reasoning applies once again (replace 
i2 by i3) to conclude that 
u((O,il))= min[d,,,d] +min[d;,,d] -d in r(l). 
As a consequence of (2.2) and (2.3), we obtain that 
(2.3) 
min[di?, d] = min[d;,, d] for all i3 EN(‘)\{il}. (2.4) 
Since d;, + d,, > A, we get that CtEN,,, dt > A and together with (1.3), this implies 
that the overall cost savings v(N(‘)) in the nontrivial subtree r(I) are the size of 
c ,ENt,, min[d,, A] - A. If it would happen that these overall cost savings in r(l) do not 
cover the overall cost savings v(N) in r, which are the size of C,,, min[dI, A] - A, 
then the nonzero remaining cost savings are the size of C/EN,,,,(,, min[d/, A]. The 
latter remaining amount, however, cannot be met by the cost savings generated by 
any number of subtrees different from r (‘I because each nontrivial subtree rck) on , 
node set Nck) U (0) generates cost savings of which the size is strictly less than 
c /E,,,,A, min[d,, A] (due to the fact that A >O). We conclude that the underlying stan- 
dard tree enterprise r contains exactly one nontrivial subtree rooted at node 0 (so, we 
ignore the trivial subtrees, rooted at node 0, of r consisting of one arc). Let node 
il t N be the unique follower of node 0 in r and let node i2 EN be some follower of 
node ii in r. So, both arcs (0, il) and (il, iz) belong to r. Furthermore, d;, + dj2 > A 
and (2.2) holds. By (2.4) the essential result is as follows: 
min[dj, A] = min[d;,, A] for all jEN\{il}. (2.5) 
In order to establish that A < d2, we distinguish two cases regarding the number of 
followers of node iI in r. 
Case 1: Suppose that node il has at least two followers, say nodes i2, i3 EN, in r, so 
both arcs (il. i2) and (il, i3) belong to r. The cost savings for the coalition {il, i2, ix} 
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in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, c( {ii }) + c({iz}) + c({is}) 
- c({i,,i2,i~})=2a((O,i,)) and on the other, by using (1.3), v({i,,&iJ})= Ci=, 
min[di,, d] - d. From the induced equality 2a((O, i, )) = c: =, min[di,, A] - A and 
(2.2) (2.3) it follows that min[di,, A] = A. In summary, we obtain that d,, > A and 
a((O,i,)) = min[di:, A] = min[d,,, A]. 
Now we are in a position to prove that A 6 d2. Assume, on the contrary, that A > d2. 
From A>d2 bd, and (2.5) we derive that A>dj for all j~N\{il}. Together with 
di, > A, this yields that ii = n and d, = d2 = . . = d,_ 1. Further, ~((0, n)) = min[di?, A] 
= d,. We distinguish two subcases. 
Subcase 1: Suppose that each node jE N\{ } n 1s a follower of node n, so all arcs of 
the form (n,j), jcN\{n}, belong to r. The cost savings for the coalition N\(n) in 
r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, C,jEN,In) c<(j)) - c(N\{n})= 
(n - 2)a((O,n))=(n - 2)d, >0 and on the other, by using (1.3), v(N\{n})=(n - 1) 
d, - min[(n - l)dr, A]. Since the cost savings are strictly positive, the induced equality 
(n - 2)d, = (n - 1)dr - min[(n - l)dr, A] reduces to (n - 2)d, = (n - l)dr - A, that is 
d, =A. 
Subcasr 2: Suppose that not all nodes jEN\{n} are followers of node n. Then 
there exists a node, say node id EN\{n,iZ,i3}, which is connected with some follower 
of node n, say with node i2 (without loss of generality). So the arc (i2,id) belongs 
to r. The cost savings for the coalition {n,iz,iJ} in r can be determined in two ways: 
on the one hand, c({n})+c({i~})+c({i4))- ({ c n,h,i~})=2a((O,n))+a((n,i2))=2d, 
+ a((n, iz)) and on the other, by using (1.3) u({n, i2, ib}) = 2 min[di:, A] = 2d,. The 
induced equality reduces to a((n,iz)) =O. Next the cost savings for the coalition (i2, 
i3, id} in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, c( {iz}) + c( (i3)) 
+ c((i4)) - CC{’ 22,i3,i4})=2a((O,n)) + a((n,iz)) =2d, >O and on the other, by us- 
ing (1.3) u({ i2, i3, id}) = 3d, - min[3di, A]. Since the cost savings are strictly positive, 
the induced equality 2d, = 3d, - min[3dl, A] reduces to 2d, = 3d, - A, that is d, = A. 
In both subcases we arrive at d, = A which result contradicts the assumption that 
A >d2 >d,. We conclude that A 6 d2. This completes the first case. 
Case 2: Suppose that node i, has exactly one follower, namely node i2 EN, in r. 
Consider some follower i3 EN of node i2 in r, so the arc (i2, i3) also belongs to r. 
The cost savings for the coalition {i,,iz,ij} in r can be determined in two ways: on 
the one hand, c({ii}) + ~((4)) + c((i3)) - c({i~,i~,i3})=2a((O,i~)) + a((i~,i:!)) and 
on the other, by using (1.3), v( {. ~,,il,i3})= xi=, min[di,,A] - A. From the induced 
equality 2a((O,il))+a((i1,i2))= xi=, min[dj,, A] -A and (2.2) (2.3) it follows that 
a((O,i,)) + a((i,,iz)) = min[diz, A]. Now we are in a position to prove that A < dz. 
We distinguish two subcases. 
Subcase 1: Suppose that node i2 has at least two followers, say nodes i3, id EN, 
in r, so both arcs (i2, i3) and (i2, i4) belong to r. The cost savings for the coalition 
{i2,is,i4} in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, c({iz}) + c((i3)) 
+ c((i4)) - c({i2,&, id}) = 2a((O, i,)) + 2a((i,,iz)) =2min[di,, A] and on the other, by 
using (1.3), u((i2, i3, id}) = 3 min[d,:, A] - min[xi =2 di,, A]. The induced equality re- 
duces to min[Ci = 2 di,, A] = min[di,, A] and therefore, di2 > A. 
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Subcase 2: Suppose that node i2 has exactly one follower, say node i3 EN, in r. 
In case node i3 has at least two followers in r, it can be shown that the arc (iz, i3) 
is costless as well as di: 3 A. In a more general setting, consider a chain enterprise 
consisting of the arcs (&_I, ik), 1 <k < t, in r, where io := 0, so that node it has at 
least two followers, say nodes it+l, it+2 EN, and the arcs (i&l, ik ), 3 < k 6 t - 1, are 
costless. The cost savings for the coalition {ik 1 1 d k < t + l} in r can be determined 
in two ways: on the one hand, a((0, il)) + (t - l)min[d;,, A] + a((ii_l,i,)) and on the 
other, by using (1.3) min[di,, A] + t min[di,, A] - A. From the induced equality and 
(2.2) it follows that a((ir_1, it)) = 0. 
Next the cost savings for the coalition {ir, &+I, ir+2} in r can be determined in two 
ways: on the one hand, 2 min[&, A] and on the other, by using (1.3) 3 min[di,, A] 
_ min[CFi, di, , A]. The induced equality reduces to min[x:.‘i, d;, , A] = min[d;,, A] 
and therefore, by (2.5), d12 3 A. 
Eventually, we end up with a chain enterprise consisting of the arcs (ik_ ,, il,), 
1 d k 6 n, where io := 0, so that the arcs (&_I,&), 3 6 k<n - 2, are costless. No- 
tice that this chain has a unique leaf, namely node i,. The cost savings for the 
grand coalition N in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, a((O,il)) 
+ (n - 2) min[diZ, A] + a((i,,_2, &_I)) and on the other, by using (1.3), min[&, A] + (n 
- 1) min[&, A] - A. From the induced equality and (2.2) it follows that a((&-2, i,_l )) 
= 0. Next the cost savings for the coalition N\{il} in r can be determined in two 
ways: on the one hand, (n -2)min[&, A] +a((i,_l,i,_,))=(n -2)min[diz, A] and on 
the other, by using (1.3) (n - 1) min[&, A] - min[Ci z2 d;, , A]. The induced equality 
reduces to min[Ci = 2 di,, A] = min[d;,, A] and therefore, d;? 2 A. 
In both subcases we arrive at di, > A. From diz > A and (2.5) we derive that dj 2 A 
for all jEN\{il} and h ence, d2 3 A. This completes the second case as well as the 
proof of the theorem. 0 
Corollary 2.4. Provided that n b 3, the zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game 
(N, c) of (1.3) can be represented as the cost savings game arising from a standard 
tree enterprise game with user set N if and only if the surplus of claims in the 
bankruptcy venture is at most the size of the second smallest claim (in the weak 
sense, i.e., 0 d A d d2 ). 
Remark 2.5. The final stage of the proof of Theorem 2.3 can be shortened whenever 
there are at least three different sizes of claims among all claims di, iE N. Given the 
latter circumstances, it follows immediately from (2.5) that dj > A for all jEN\{il} 
and hence, d2 3 A. 
Involving the bankruptcy venture with the three different claims dl = 100, d2 = 150, 
d3 = 175 (see Example 1.5), the surplus of claims A equals 425 - E and thus, d2 3 A 
iff E 3275. Particularly, by Corollary 2.4, the bankruptcy venture corresponding to 
the estate E = 250 cannot be associated with any standard tree enterprise on node set 
{0,1,2,3} ( w tc result was already shown by means of Example 1.4). h’ h 
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Remark 2.6. Let us compare the current results with the results obtained by Driessen 
[6] who studied the interrelationship between bankruptcy games and minimum cost 
spanning tree games. 
In the context of the spanning tree enterprise, the player set N represents the set 
of users in the cable-television network (i.e., nodes of the complete graph which is 
provided with a nonnegative arc-cost-function) and the cost function c: 2N -+ R is 
defined so that, for each coalition S c N, the cost figure c(S) equals the least cost to 
connect all users in S to the central supplier 0 via arcs of a spanning tree on node set 
S U (0). This type of a game is well-known as a minimum cost spanning tree game. 
Driessen [6] established that the zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game (N, v) 
of (1.3) can be represented as the cost savings game arising from a minimum cost 
spanning tree game with user set N if and only if one of the following two conditions 
is satisfied: 
l The surplus of claims A in the bankruptcy venture is at most the size of the third 
smallest claim (in the weak sense, i.e., 0 6 A 6 C& )
l There exists a unique natural number k E {3,4,. . . , n - l} such that dk <A 6 dk+] 
and C:=, dt 6 A. 
Consequently, bankruptcy ventures that can be associated with some standard tree enter- 
prise, can also be associated with some spanning tree enterprise (since A < d2 implies 
A < d3). However, the bankruptcy venture with the three different claims dl = 100, d2 = 
150, dj = 175 (see Example 1.5) and the variable estate E satisfying 250 6 E ~275, 
cannot be associated with any standard tree enterprise, but it can still be associ- 
ated with some spanning tree enterprise on node set (0, 1,2,3}. For instance, con- 
sider the zero-normalized three-person bankruptcy game (N, v) in case E = 250 (see 
Example 1.5). It appears that the game (N, v) can be associated with the spanning 
tree enterprise on node set (0, 1,2,3} of which the arc-cost-function a is given by 
a((O,l))=a((O,2))=a((O,3))=350, a((1,2))=275, a((1,3))=250, a((2,3))=200. 
Indeed, the cost savings game arising from the corresponding minimum cost spanning 
tree game equals the game (N,v). For further properties in the context of bankruptcy 
games and minimum cost spanning tree games, see [ 1, 61. 
3. An application: the case of the nucleolus for a standard tree enterprise 
In order to exploit the equivalence between bankruptcy ventures and standard tree 
enterprises, let us determine the nucleolus for the specific standard tree enterprises 
which we encountered within the proof of Theorem 2.3. 
Let node 1 EN be the unique follower of node 0 in the standard tree enterprise r 
and let node 2 EN be some follower of node 1 in r (assuming that n > 3 and r has no 
trivial subtrees, rooted at node 0, consisting of one arc). So, both arcs (0,l) and (1,2) 
belong to I’, where a((0, 1)) >O. We distinguish two possibilities for the structure of 
the standard tree enterprise. 
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Structure I: Suppose that node 1 has at least two followers in r (cf. case one 
in the proof of Theorem 2.3). It turns out that any arc in r, which is not incident 
with a leaf or node 0, is costless. Hence, the cost savings game (N,w) arising from the 
corresponding standard tree enterprise game (N, c) is given by w(S) = (ISI - 1 )a((O, 1)) 
for all S c N, S # 0. Notice that this game is symmetric, that is the cost savings merely 
depend on the number of users in coalition S and not the users themselves. Because of 
the symmetry property of the nucleolus, the total cost savings u(N) are shared equally 
among the users. 
Structure 2: Suppose that node 1 has exactly one follower, namely node 2r N, in 
r (cf. case two in the proof of Theorem 2.3). It turns out that any arc in r, which 
is not incident with a leaf or node 1, is costless. Hence, the cost savings game (N, w) 
arising from the corresponding standard tree enterprise game (N,c) is given by 
for all ScN\{l}, S # 0, 
w(s)= 
or S=(l), 
a((O,l)) +(jSl - 2)[a((O, 1)) +a((l,2))] for all SCN with l~s, 
S#{l]. 
With the standard tree enterprise r, we associate the bankruptcy venture of which the 
claims d,, iE,‘v, of the creditors and the estate E of the bankrupt concern are given by 
dl := 4(0, 1)) di:=a((O,l)) + u((l,2)) for all i~N\{l}, and E:= 
(n - l)u((O, 1)) + (n - 2)u(( 1,2)). Clearly, the surplus of claims in this bankruptcy 
venture satisfies A=u((O,1))+u((l,2)), so A=d; for all 1’~N\{l} and A > dl. Now 
it follows from (1.3) that the corresponding zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game 
(N, u) agrees with the cost savings game (N, w). Consequently, the cost allocation prob- 
lem of allocating the least total costs c(N) to the users in the standard tree enterprise 
is equivalent to the division problem of dividing the estate E among the creditors. In 
fact, any cost allocation ye R” in the standard tree enterprise corresponds to a savings 
allocation XE Rn in the bankruptcy venture by means of 
y2=c({i})+max[0,di-Al-x-i for all iEN 
(based on the relationship that c(S) = Cjgs c({j})+ CIES ~({j}) - u(S) for all S c N, 
where (N,u) is the corresponding n-person bankruptcy game). 
Let us apply the procedure involving the determination of the nucleolus for gen- 
eral bankruptcy ventures (cf. [2, 51) to this specific bankruptcy venture. Because of 
E 3 i xjE,, dj, each creditor gets at least half of his claim. Each pair of creditors, not 
containing creditor 1, are substitutes (that is interchanging the roles of both creditors 
does not change the zero-normalized bankruptcy game (N, v)) and therefore, all credi- 
tors different from creditor 1 earn the same amount according to the nucleolus concept. 
We distinguish two cases. 
Case 1: Suppose that the estate is significant, i.e., E 2 xjEN dj - indl, or equiva- 
lently, (n - 2)u((O, 1)) 3 2u(( 1,2)). Each creditor i E N receives the amount the size 
of x, = d, - a where 0 d x < id, is determined by the efficiency condition CiEN d, 
- nx = E. Thus, IX = K’ A and we conclude that the cost allocation YE KY, which 
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represents the nucleolus for this specific standard tree enterprise, is given by yi = c( { i}) 
-Xi =~((i}) - d; + n-‘d =a-‘[u((O, 1)) + a(( 1,2))] + 6i for all DEN, where 6i rep- 
resents the cost of the arc incident with user i, provided that user i is a leaf in r 
(otherwise, dj = 0). 
That is, according to the nucleolus concept, the least total costs c(N) is allocated 
in such a way that each leaf in the standard tree enterprise is charged its separable 
cost (i.e., the cost of the arc incident with the leaf) and the remaining nonseparable 
costs the size of ~((0, I))+a(( 1,2)) is equally charged to all users in the standard tree 
enterprise. This completes the first case. 
Case 2: Suppose that the estate is large, i.e., E < CjEN dj - indl, or equivalently, 
(n - 2)a((O, 1)) < 2a(( 1,2)). Creditor 1 receives x1 = idI, while each other creditor 
i E N\{ 1) receives the amount the size of xi = LX where id2 < M 6 d2 - id, is deter- 
mined by the efficiency condition idl+(n-l)a=E. Thus, (x=(n-l)-‘[(n-i)a((O, 1)) 
+ (n - 2)a(( 1,2))] and we conclude that the cost allocation YE Iw”, which represents 
the nucleolus for this specific tree enterprise, is given by yi = c({ 1)) 
-XI = $((O, 1)) and y;=c({i})-xi=a((O, l))+a((1,2))+6i-(n-l)-‘[(n-;)u((O, 1)) 
+(n - 2)a((1,2))]=(n - I)-‘[ia((O, l))+a((1,2))] +& for all iEN\{l}. 
That is, according to the nucleolus concept, the least total costs c(N) is allocated in 
such a way that each leaf in the standard tree enterprise is charged its separable cost, 
node 1 is charged half of the cost of its connecting arc to the supplier, whereas the 
remaining costs the size of ia((O, 1)) + a(( 1,2)) is equally charged to all users in the 
standard tree enterprise, except for user 1. This completes the second case. 
For the general treatment of the nucleolus for standard tree enterprises, we refer to 
[lo]. Let us conclude the paper with a remark concerning the possible representation 
of the cost savings game corresponding to a standard tree enterprise game as the zero- 
normalized version of some bankruptcy game. It is still an open problem to provide, if 
possible, necessary and sufficient conditions on the data of the standard tree enterprise 
in order to establish this (reversed) representation of standard tree enterprises versus 
bankruptcy ventures. 
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